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ABOUT THE SADC FUTURES 
PROJECT
In these highly uncertain and rapidly changing times, the SADC 
region, like many regions in Africa, remains fundamentally dependent 
on a resilient agricultural system and natural resource base. Climate 
change still poses the greatest threat to the agricultural system 
and therefore technical capacity is needed to address these future 
impacts and adapt plans, policies and programs. Taking into account 
alternative futures, the SADC Futures project has produced tailored 
supporting materials and documents as part of a wider approach for 
foresight training in the region. These documents and the associated 
foresight framework aim to equip users to practically apply the range 
of foresight tools and methods for innovative strategic planning and 
policy formulation for climate resilience. 
This SADC Futures Project is a joint initiative of the SADC Secretariat’s 
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR) Directorate, the Centre 
for Coordination of Agricultural Research and Development for Southern 
Africa (CCARDESA), the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) 
through the CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture 
and Food Security (CCAFS) and German Development Cooperation 
facilitated through the SADC / Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH ‘Adaptation to Climate Change in Rural 
Areas’ program (ACCRA), funded by the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). 
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SADC Futures
Developing Foresight Capacity 
for Climate Resilient 
Agricultural Development
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Why is it happening?
Plan
What do we want to experience in the future? What 
might get in our way? What might we do to get there?
Prospection
What might happen that we have not thought about?
Reflection
What might we want to do differently?
Strategy
What will we do differently?
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INPUT PLAN PROSPECTION REFLECTION STRATEGY
Context Why is it 
happening?
What will we do 
differently?


















































Stakeholder engagement and participation 
Data, evidence, knowledge and creativity 
What might 
we want to do 
differently?
What might 
happen that we 
have not thought 
about?
What do we want 
to experience in 
the future? What 
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For Enhanced Climate  
Resilience and Agriculture 
Policy Development in the 
SADC Region
To expand on the foresight and futures capacity building the project has produced a series of accompanying knowledge products and sources. The 
knowledge series mapped to the SADC Futures foresight framework is shown below.
ABOUT THE SADC FUTURES KNOWLEDGE SERIES
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACCRA Adaptation to Climate Change in Rural Areas 
ASR Aquifer Storage and Recovery 
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BMZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
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01 In 2018, the total population of SADC was estimated at 344.8 million inhabitants 
across the 16 member states, accounting for 32% of the sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) population and 4.5% of the world population in that year (World Bank, 
2019). Further, at its current growth rate, the SADC population is projected to reach 
947.3 million persons by 2065 (UNDP, 2017 cited in SADC, 2020). 
Poverty remains one of the greatest challenges in the SADC region, with 
approximately half of the population living on less than $1 a day. About 
70% of the region’s population depends on agriculture for food, 
income, and employment, which relies on the right amount of 
rain at the right time (SADC, 2019). The distribution of risk to food 






































The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a regional economic 
institution consisting of 16 member states (see map below), with the objective 
of achieving regional integration and poverty eradication in the region through 
economic development and ensuring peace and security (SADC website).
MAP OF THE SADC REGION
MAP OF POPULATION AT RISK OF FOOD AND 




























From the IPCC definition of climate-resilient pathways it is 
clear that they closely interact with sustainable development 
strategies, and they are also driven by the specific nature 
of climate change impacts and responses encountered. 
There is considerable uncertainty about how climate 
change and responses to it will unfold in the future, just 
as there is uncertainty about some of the key drivers 
of sustainable development such as levels and 
distribution of economic growth, management 
and scarcity of land and water resources, level of 
cooperation or conflict between states, and so on.
Using foresight techniques that encompass 
innovative policy formulation and solution design 
methods gives us a process of considering 
alternative possible futures. Foresight 
techniques do not predict the future, but 
rather they generate a process amongst 
groups of participants to consider trends 
and drivers of the future and how they 
may play out, as well as support medium to 
long term vision building that can inform present-
day decisions and actions (UNDP, 2018).
Scenario building is one of the techniques in the foresight toolbox. Scenarios are built 
up through a process of identifying a specific problem/policy issue that 
frames the future landscape of interest. These frames are defined by geography, 
topics, and time frames. Building scenarios requires identifying the key factors we are 
uncertain about, and that will play a key role in determining what the future will look like. 
So, for example, one scenario exercise from South Africa was developed to consider 
potential directions water use in the country could take up to 2050. In this example, a key 
uncertainty is the impact of climate change on rainfall patterns. Another is the effectiveness 
of regional water use management. In this case the future landscape of interest is climate-
resilient development pathways at the SADC regional level.
Scenarios help us to understand that there are various plausible versions 
of the future and they may not look very much like the one we have 
implicitly (or explicitly) in our heads.  
The predicted impact of climate change on precipitation, temperature and the increased frequency and 
intensity of droughts and floods in the SADC region are likely to negatively affect the availability of water resources 
and the agricultural sector with significant impacts on low income and subsistence farmers (Davis-Reddy and Vincent, 
2017). On-going and predicted changes in the region will largely be attributed to long-term change in rainfall rather 
than to short-term effects like floods and droughts, with the region seeing medium to long-term effects from climate 
change, as well as high impact events. The effects include the loss of land areas suitable for cropping as well as loss of 
productivity on lands in production. Due to the high numbers of very poor people dependent on rainfed agriculture in the 
region, the impacts of climate change will play a critical role in any economic development strategy aimed at eradicating 
poverty. To that end, it is necessary to identify climate-resilient pathways of economic growth for the region. 
As defined by Denton et 





AND ACTIONS THAT 
REDUCE CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND ITS 
IMPACTS. They also 
include actions to ensure that 
effective risk management and 
adaptation can be implemented 
and sustained (high confidence, 
medium evidence, high 
agreement). 
Adaptation and mitigation have the 
potential to both contribute to and 
impede sustainable development, 
and sustainable development strategies and 
choices have the potential to both contribute 
to and impede climate change responses.
How should we go about designing 
and implementing climate-resilient 
development pathways when there 
are so many uncertainties around 
how the world will unfold in the 
near future? 
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Look back to 2020 
and ask ”what do we 
remember about how we got 
to here?”; “what actions, 
partnerships, policy changes, 
etc. did we carry out”? to get 
to the 2030 success?




Step into 2030 and 
position yourself in 
the successfully 
achieved vision such 





needed to be 
addressed
UNDP (2018) gives a 
concise view of the value 
of foresight in developing 
strategies:
THE PREMISE OF FORESIGHT 
IS THAT THE FUTURE IS STILL 
IN THE MAKING AND CAN 
BE ACTIVELY INFLUENCED 
OR EVEN CREATED, RATHER 
THAN WHAT HAS ALREADY 
BEEN DECIDED OR ENACTED 
IN THE PAST BY OTHERS, 
THERE ONLY TO UNEARTH 
OR REPLICATE, AND 
PASSIVELY ACCEPTED AS A 
GIVEN OR ‘GOOD PRACTICE’.
Scenarios can also be used to help 
identify the key features of the future we 
want, and necessary actions to get there. 
This involves a process of identifying 
a preferred future and expanding on 
its features through a process called 
“visioning”. Then, a technique of 
“backcasting” can be used to identify key 
steps and actions needed to get to the 
preferred future from the present situation. 
See the discussion from UNDP 
manual on foresight to the right.
VISIONING AND BACKCASTING:  
TEXT EXCERPT FROM UNDP 
FORESIGHT MANUAL (UNDP, 2018)
Visioning is a method for identifying, developing and 
enriching a compelling, referred future. Visioning is the 
first step in creating a powerful strategy of tranformative policy. In 
foresight visioning is sometimes called “incasting” because it goes 
in-depth into one particular scenario – which is the contrast to 
the visioning approach in the conventional strategic planning that 
focuses on “vision statement”. Moreover, visioning in foresight is 
usually done for period of at least 10 years in the future.
Participatory elaborating and enriching a vision is one of the 
most effective mechanisms for engaging a team, organisation or 
community and getting them excited to push forward into new 
territory. A successfully designed policy, plan, or service should 
aim to impact the thoughts and behaviours of society and culture, 
and serve as an example of the mindset and values of its creators 
– and visioning helps develop that. Creating a clear and 
compelling vision is a precursor to strategic planning, 
and key to creating the conditions to mobilise a group 
of collaborators  around a common policy.
Ultimately, visioning in foresight is not about creating my 
vision, but about creating a shared vision co-owned by the 
stakeholders.
BACKCASTING
This method was originally developed by Robinson (1990) with the intention to 
prevent extrapolation of the present into the future that is common 
in forecasting. It is closely related to the concept of “anticipatory models” in which 
insights come from the expected future situation (feed-forward) rather than in relation to 
expectations (goals / objectives) set in the past (feed-back). There are different ways to 
apply backcasting, but backcasting should never be mere “back-planning” 
because it does not plan from future to the present, but attempts to 
understand how a particular future situation might develop. Backcasting 
can be used as a very useful addition to visioning, or any other scenario method. 
The process starts by developing a normative (preferred / desirable or in some 
cases, idealized) future and then working backwards to identify major events and 
data points (signals) that generated that future.
It leads to identifying a potential trajectory or “how it all might happen”.
This allows organisations to consider what actions, policies and programs are 
needed today that will connect the future to the present.
Backcasting reminds participants that the future is not linear, and 
can have many alternative outcomes depending on decisions made 
and the impact of external events on an organisation. It focuses on 







Over the past 10 years there have been a myriad of foresight exercises and scenarios developed that are 
relevant to consider in the context of building climate-resilient pathways of development in the SADC region. 
These scenarios consider different pathways for developing climate-resilient food and agricultural 
systems relevant for the region. However, not all the scenarios are developed for the region; most are 
either at SSA or country level, with a few at regional level, and several at global level.  
The aim of this review is to summarize the key points of these scenario building exercises: 
What were they developed for? 
What key drivers were identified? 
What were the key uncertainties, and 






IPCC’s shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs);
Van Dijk and Meijerink (2014): A review of global food security scenario and assessment studies: 
results, gaps, and research priorities; and 




THE MAJOR FEATURES OF THE SSPS 
ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
SSP 1 a world of sustainability-focused growth 
and equality;
SSP 2 a “middle of the road” world where 
trends broadly follow historical patterns; 
SSP 3 a fragmented world of “resurgent 
nationalism”; 
SSP 4 a world of ever-increasing inequality; and
SSP 5 a world of rapid and unconstrained 
growth in economic output and energy use.
KEY DRIVERS IN THESE SCENARIOS 
INCLUDE: 
Population growth and distribution.
Education levels.
Patterns of urbanization.
Economic growth and distribution.
Scale and structure of future energy supply.
Levels of climate change. 







Various goals Global 
sustainability























One of the principle uncertainties these scenarios 
address is the degree of socio-economic challenge the 
world would face for mitigating and adapting to 
climate change. 
In SSP1, the challenge to both adaptation and mitigation 
are low, while in SSP3 they are both high. In SSP5, there 
are high challenges to mitigating climate change but not 
for adaptation, while in SSP4 the opposite is true. SSP2 
represents intermediate socio-economic challenges to 
adapting and mitigating climate change. 
Each of the SSP scenarios include land use changes 
that arise from changes in agricultural and industrial demand 
in response to the assumptions of drivers in each respective 
scenario. For example, high population growth coupled 
with low agricultural productivity and limited environmental 
protection results in a large expansion of agricultural area 
in SSP3, compared with that of SSP1 where a sustainable 
transformation of agriculture reduces land use expansion. 
Other factors that come into play include patterns of dietary 
transitions and food waste.
12 GLOBAL LEVEL SCENARIOS 
RELATING TO FOOD SECURITY. 
In a study from 2014, Van Dijk et al. summarize the 
main features of 12 global scenarios related to food 
security. They find that key drivers common across 
all these scenarios are population growth, economic 
development, and technological change. Other 
important factors that often characterize a scenario are 
assumptions on policies (e.g., trade and environmental 
policies) and institutions (reinforcing markets or dealing 
with market failures, strong governance at global, 
national, or decentralized levels).
They classify scenarios into “families” based on 
the key assumptions and narratives associated with each 
(Van Vuuren et al., 2012). This study proposed a typology 
of six scenario ‘archetypes’ or scenario ‘families’ which are 
determined by assumptions on the future developments of 
five key drivers: economic development, population growth, 
technology development, trade, policies, and institutions. 
These five scenario families and the assumptions they include 



















































Figure is from Van Dijk and Meijerink (2014) and has been 
adapted and stylized from Van Vuuren et al. (2012) and authors
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FIGURE 01: FIVE SCENARIO FAMILIES
IPCC SSPS
The most well-known and well-used scenarios 
related to climate-resilient development 
pathways at the global level are those 
used by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC). 
They have developed a set of 5 “shared 
socio-economic pathways” (SSPs) that 
delineate different pathways of development 
and their associated resilience to climate 
change. 
The SSPs look at five different ways in which the 
world might evolve in the absence of climate 
policy and how this would affect achieving 
climate change adaptation and mitigation. 
Essentially, the SSPs are scenarios designed to help 
understand how socio-economic factors will affect 
the global community’s capacity to undertake climate 
change adaption and mitigation actions. These are 
intended to span the range of plausible futures.
Van Dijk et al. (2014) critique the way in which 
these global scenarios have dealt with food 
security because they do not include drivers related to 
two key dimensions of food security: food utilization 
and stability. Instead they are mostly focused on food 
availability (e.g., production) and access (e.g., 
income and distribution). They note that three other 
key drivers can be expected to have important impacts on 
food security: 
Climate change;
The increasing use of bio-energy and 
biomaterials; and
Shifts in diets and consumer 
preferences. 
They conclude that at the time of their publication (e.g. 
2014) these issues were being raised in the 
scenarios but only dealt with on a superficial 
level. They also pointed out that new drivers or new 
interpretations of existing drivers were being considered in 
global scenarios. These include: alternative sources of food 
supply as in plant-based meats, new technologies, 
or issues such as post-harvest losses and food 
waste which recent studies have identified as significant. 
Poverty and equitable development are also being 
increasingly considered as key drivers of food security in 
scenarios. 
FAO (2018) USED SCENARIOS TO 
LOOK AT PLAUSIBLE FUTURES 
FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 
AT GLOBAL SCALE AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FOOD 
SECURITY. The scenarios were specifically 
designed to sketch what the world might look like 
in the face of specific “mega-challenges” to food 
security in the future considering two main areas: 
Challenges for food access and utilization incorporated into the scenarios 
by considering different degrees of equity that ensure universal access to food, 
adequate food utilization and satisfactory nutrition outcomes under 
adequate education and health conditions.
Challenges for food stability and availability. They comprise challenges for 
ensuring sustainable production patterns that allow for–in different degrees and 
depending on the scenario–sufficient, nutritious, safe, and stable levels 
of agricultural food supplies.
In this exercise, FAO developed three alternative scenarios: 
Business as usual (BAU)
Towards sustainability (TSS), and
Stratified societies (SSS). 
Key drivers here include: 
Population growth and distribution
Economic growth and distribution
Trends in income inequality 
Capital intensity in agriculture 
(e.g., investments in infrastructure) 
Land quality
Technologies
Research and development 
Consumer demand trends for food 
and non-food items–including 
bioenergy, and the degree of 
food loss and waste in food value 
chains 
Agricultural greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and mitigation actions
Crop yields taking into account 
technical change and climate 
change 
Cropping intensity 
Land and water availability 
(including effects of land 
degradation)




























Growth and structure (e.g., age distribution)
Investment and access Source and price  
Demand




Rainfall patterns, water 
demand, land degradation
Rate and distribution Rate and nature of growth Change in diets as incomes rise
Source and rate
Transparency and scale of focus
How will population growth in low- and 
middle-income (LMIC) countries compare 
with that of the industrialized world.
Will access to education become 
more equitable? Across income, 
gender, ethnicity differentiations? 
Fossil fuels or renewables? 
Increase or decrease in 
demand and prices.
Can significant 
reductions in food 
waste be achieved 
at reasonable cost 
throughout food 
value chains?
Will there be an increase in capital 
investment in agriculture in low income 
countries with large agricultural-dependent 
populations?  Will it be primarily from 
private or public sector sources? 
How will climate change impact on 
rainfall and temperature patterns 
in a given location? What are 
the implications for the ability to 
effectively manage water resources?
Low to medium growth globally and 
lower levels of growth in LMICs in 
order to reduce population pressures.
The ideal is equitable access 
which implies increases in 
investment into human capital 
in low income countries.
Ideal is moving towards 
renewables sources 
of energy.  In addition, 
decreases in demand 
for energy due to greater 
attention to efficiency. 
Significant 
reduction in waste 
at each stage in the 
value chains, from 
farm to consumers.
The ideal is increased capital 
investments in low income 
countries in areas that will 
increase productivity and 
improve rural livelihoods.
The ideal depends very much 
on location.  Reducing exposure 
to extreme events such as 
drought and flooding from heavy 
rainfall is desirable across all.
FIGURE 02:  SUMMARY OF GLOBAL LEVEL SCENARIOS
How will economic growth be 
distributed between high and low 
income countries?  Will LMIC 
countries be able to increase 
their levels of economic growth?
Rapid or slow growth? 
Medium or megacities?
Will dietary transition continue with 
past trends towards non-healthy 
diets? Or will more nutritious diets 
become more widespread? 
Will we see higher rates of productivity growth in 
areas where productivity is currently low?  Will the 
source of productivity come from expanding land or 
input use – or expanding efficiency of inputs? 
Will global structures of governance be 
stronger or weaker?  Will we see an increase 
in nationalistic governance patterns? Will 
governance be transparent and equitable or 
corrupt and serving only elites? 
The ideal is achieving 
more equitable growth, 
which implies higher 
levels of growth in low 
income countries.
Not always 
clear what the 
ideal would be, 
but generally 
moderate growth 
in urbanization is 
preferred.
Increase in dietary diversity 
and consumption of fruits and 
vegetables. In high income 
countries reduction in meat 
consumption, substitution 
with other forms of protein 
including fish and legumes. 
The ideal is increasing the efficiency of inputs 
to agriculture – e.g. getting greater output from 
the same or lower amounts of inputs used more 
efficiently. Particularly important factor influencing 
environmental outcomes (e.g. reduced land 
expansion and overuse of inputs are key sources 
of environmental damage and GHG emissions). 
The ideal is much improved global governance 
of global commons -to address issues such 
as climate change, global trade management 
and managing pandemics.
In addition, the ideal is improved transparency 
and functioning of national/local levels of 
governance.
Figure 2 summarizes the key features of the global level scenarios relevant for agri-food systems described in the sections above.  The table summarizes the main drivers and their key features that these 
scenarios are built upon, as well as the major uncertainties identified for each driver.  The final column indicates some of the features of a desired or ideal future that have been expressed in these scenarios.
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Moving to the scale of SSA, there have 
been several scenario exercises 
devoted to issues around agricultural 
development. These studies have been 
developed to consider alternative futures 
and strategic planning for SSA agricultural 
production and productivity growth, 
agricultural research, agri-business, and 
more broadly food systems and ecosystem 
services. 
The drivers identified in these 
scenario exercises include those 
seen at the global scale, e.g., 
population and economic growth, 
climate change, trade policies and 
technology developments. However, 
there are differences in how these 
drivers are formulated, making them 
more specific for the SSA context. 
For example, the degree to which 
an urbanized middle class will 
expand is specific to the nature of 
economic development as a driver 
of climate-resilience development 
pathways in SSA in the future, as is 
the huge expected increase in youth 
population and the implications this 
will have for growth of employment 
in different sectors of the economy. 
At the global level, the progression and 
impacts of climate change are key drivers. 
At SSA level the willingness and ability of 
countries in SSA to undertake adaptation 
actions is given greater attention. Other SSA 
specific climate change drivers are related 
to developments in international climate 
policy and implementation which will affect 
availability of financing. 
These broad drivers apply across SSA and various sectors. Moving 
to the specific issues related to agriculture and food systems, it is 
useful to consider drivers and uncertainties in three main categories 
of the agri-food system: agricultural supply, food demand and 
agricultural value chains.  Figure 03 gives a summary of these 
drivers and uncertainties by category from the SSA scenarios reviewed.
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A fairly consistent set of drivers associated with 
megatrends in the SSA context emerges from this set 
of scenarios. These include:
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
Population triples by 2050, huge increase in youth 
population entering the work force.
SOURCE AND LEVEL OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
Overall growth is moderate, service sector is increasingly 
important as are the agricultural and mining sectors, 
industrialization less so.
GLOBAL ENERGY AND FOOD PRICES/MARKETS
Generally upward trends and possibility of increased 
volatility.
GOVERNANCE
Ranges from highly centralized to more local control; 
increases in transparency but still high levels of 
corruption.
GLOBAL DEMANDS FOR RESOURCES
A declining ability to meet the demand for food and 
agriculture products as well as biomass-based products 
(implying greater demand for African sources). 
LAND TENURE
Much land is under customary land tenure, calls for 
land reform in many countries, process of increasing 
concentration of ownership by rural and urban elites as 
well as external investors in several countries.
DEGRADATION/DEPLETION OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES
Water depletion and soil degradation are key concerns.
SCENARIOS AT SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA SCALE
Drivers of 
agricultural supply
Drivers of food 
demand
Drivers of agricultural 
value chain
Where will food for 
growing populations and 
demand come from?  
Will it be from domestic 
production or imports?
Where will agricultural 
productivity growth 
occur?  Will it include 
small-scale producers 
or only medium/large 
commercial enterprises?
Will there be a 




Will the urbanization 
and the development 
of middle class 
continue and be 
equitable?
Will there be much 
expansion in demand 
for non-food biomass 
products that could 
compete with food 
production? 
Will dietary transformation 
associated with higher 
incomes follow along 
lines of the past (demand 
for processed foods) or to 
a more nutritionally sound 
trajectory?  
Use of ICT in agricultural 
value chains: will it 
expand? Will it exclude 
small producers or 
enable their participation 
in these value chains?  
Will value chains 
be labour using or 
labour-saving? Could 
agricultural value chains 
be a critical source of 
employment for the 
increasing rural youth 
population?  
Can food waste be 
decreased?  In SSA 
what are key nodes 
of the value chain 




agriculture: Will there be 
growth in demand for 
sustainably grown and/
or local production? 
Will attitudes towards 
biotech shift or not?
Will there be provision of 
income support/safety 
net schemes to urban 
poor driving food demand 
and food security 
amongst this group?
Availability of water 
supplies (Will climate 
change impacts reduce 
or increase supplies?  
Will water management 
infrastructure and 
institutions improve water 
management?) 
Source/level of 
investments in agriculture 
(Will it increase from 
current levels? How much 
will private vs. public 
investment be? What 
will be the main areas of 
investment? Export related 
or domestic?) 
Climate change 
impacts (level of 
impacts as well 
as responses)
How will productivity 
growth be achieved?     
Will it be primarily from:
1. Land expansion;
2. Increased crop 
intensity; or
3. Yield enhancing 
technologies/inputs?
Quality of land 
resources (Will 
land degradation 
be reversed or 
continue?)
In most cases the scenarios at the SSA level give an indication of the features of a desired future. These varied depending on the main 
focus of the scenario, the drivers and uncertainties, however there are some common themes that emerge.  In addition, there are some 
indicators where divergencies in how the ideal future is viewed start to appear. 
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FIGURE 03:  KEY UNCERTAINTIES ON DRIVERS OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SYSTEMS FUTURES IN SSA Photos (left to right): A’Melody Lee (World Bank) / Neil Palmer (CIAT) / Geraldine Klarenberg (ILRI)
Features of desired future fairly consistent across all studies Features where divergencies in vision of ideal future occur
Equitable and sustained growth driven by improved market linkages within and external to SSA, good 
governance, and economic management: 
Strong African states that support pan-African collaboration; 
Strong and well-functioning state administrations; and
Regional trade strong and well organized.
High or increased levels of economic growth driven by increases in agriculture and manufacturing sectors:
Development of the agro-processing sector could be the key for launching manufacturing growth; 
Industrial policy designed to promote private investment and job growth in local non-farm sectors, which simultaneously acts 
as a stimulus to investment in local agri-food systems;
Source of economic growth is based on growth of human capabilities and productivity in Africa and not export revenues; and
Increased investments in physical infrastructure (roads, ports, and electrification) to reduce the costs of production in both 
industry and agriculture and thereby promote competitiveness and job creation.
Social and environmental values embodied in codes and protocols; and
Increased installed renewable energy capacity – either through development at local level or from 
centralized state investments. 
Africa becomes food self-sufficient, and is neither an exporter 
nor importer of food. Or Africa becomes a net food exporter or net 
importer but reduces food imports;
Small-scale agricultural producers play a key role in 
responding to increased demand for agricultural products, but 
this depends upon several factors.  Some of these raised in the 
scenarios include:
Potential competition from foreign investment driven 
agricultural producers (which could push smallholders out of 
the markets; 
Developments with land tenure (e.g. changes that 
support ability and incentives of smallholders to invest.  One 
aspect raised is the potential evolution from customary 
tenure to state managed titles);
Specific means of bringing smallholders into 
productive activities for example, contracts that bundle 
land concession with processing could be a potential means 
of stimulating agricultural growth for smallholders; and
Increased investments in agricultural research 
and development (R&D) that are scale-neutral, support 
agricultural extension programs, and programs designed to 
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At the regional level, the scenarios we see that 
have the same drivers as at the global and SSA 
level are important, but with an increasing 
level of specificity to the conditions in the 
SADC region. In addition, drivers specific to the 
SADC region are identified, with the main focus on 
regional integration and coordination for investment, 






Investment in human capital 
and educational facilities 
and technologies in the 
region
Will there be a significant increase in human 
capital underpinned by technological 
advancements in the region?
Climate change impacts on regional 
cooperation
Ability to manage state sovereignty to achieve regional cooperation. 
Will climate change force states to cooperate in terms of water, 
energy and food supplies?
Will the strongest economies stay in the SADC free trade zone or go 
out on their own?
The key drivers and uncertainties 
raised in the SADC level scenarios 
reviewed include the following
Regional integration
Will it continue? Will it have 
“teeth”? e.g., investment and 
enforcement capacities and will 
regional trade expand?
Structure of regional 
economy/source of growth
Will industrialization take off?  
Will service sector remain main sector of 
growth? 
Agriculture growth in both production and value 
chains as a key driver of economic growth?
Quality of governance–
strength of political 
economy
Growth in authoritarian states and 
power of military, elite capture and 
corruption compared with greater 
participation and power for civil 
society.
SADC AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGIONAL SCENARIOS
Shift of food production from water 
scarce to water abundant areas and 
increase in regional food trade. 
Improvements in productivity and 
livelihoods of small-scale farmers, 
possibly organized around cooperative 
structures capable of servicing the market 
needs in the south where better prices are likely 
to be found. 
Better regional management of water 
resources.  Could include development 
of aquifer storage and recovery (ASR), also 
known as managed aquifer recharge (MAR), an 
emerging technology that is increasingly being 
mainstreamed in water-constrained parts of the 
world. 
Mapping of new energy sources in the 
region, specifically those involving low grade 
heat sources such as those found along the 
southern-most extremity of the Great Rift Valley 
as it intersects the Caprivi Strip, and trading in 
the difference between average and firm energy 
to the south. 
Development of water management 
infrastructure. Development of water 
management infrastructure specifically suited 
to small-scale agriculture focused on poverty 
eradication and climate change resilience-
building. Focus on low maintenance concepts 
such as rainwater harvesting, specifically where 
this might be linked to the production of food or 
the recharging of localized aquifers.
Expanded water stewardship 
roles of the private sector, including 
through Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR), and an increase in the numbers of 
outgrower schemes could serve as a key 
driver of rural development.
Transport infrastructure that 
supports regional integration.  
There are likely to be three major north-
south transport corridors, each capable 
of multiple use for electricity and 
potentially even water or gas pipelines.
Positive changes in global 
political economy that could 
reinforce improvements in SADC political 
economy. 
Inter-regional trade thrives in 
tariff-free zone.
Effective growth of investment in 
education throughout the population 
supported by the development and 
distribution of latest technologies.
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Accelerated process of land reform, increased 
certainty of rights for farm dwellers and commercial 
farmers.
Government supported rural development 
program with financial and technical support for those 
receiving tenure rights. Government subsidies/support to 
small-scale agriculture.
Sustainable development of irrigation in particular 
the use of groundwater. Increase in consumer awareness 
of water scarcity/use. Water pricing implemented. 
Commercialize and widely distribute water recycling/reuse 
technologies.
Decentralization of systems and governance. 
Central government’s role is one of coordination, but 
decision-making is at the local level.
High levels of connectedness between 
individuals, people, nature, and communities facilitated 
by technology. 
Shift in values toward more ecological concerns 
and away from solely human centered.
Business-government engagement–local, regional, 
and national collaboration supported by information flows.
Diversified agricultural production systems with 
strong public support. Robust and functioning land tenure. 
Skilled agricultural labour force. Private sector investment 
for broad agricultural growth incentivized by public 
programs. Cohesive policy making.
Photo: Thomas Bennie-unsplash
Centralization of governance vs. decentralization to local power.
Shifts in values towards ecological concerns.
Level of connectedness of people through technology.
The duality of the current agriculture system, where large commercial 
farms produce food for the formal value chain and smallholders are marginalized.
Uncertainty in land and agricultural policy and the resulting decline in 
agricultural investment.
The concentration of power in the hands of a few corporates and the 
influence of this on consumer choices.
Nutritional trends: Rate of stunting/undernutrition amongst low 
income children. The ongoing nutrition transition in favor of high-calorie 
convenience foods and associated lifestyle changes. The impact of this on the 
health of the nation and the development of chronic non-communicable 
diseases.
The impact of the scarcity of resources–particularly arable land 
and water and the further risk posed by the decline in water quality.
The steady depletion of fishery stocks.
The increased variability related to impacts of changes in weather and rainfall 
due to climate change.
Economic growth rates.
Climate change: How will climate change impact water and 
temperatures and what are the implications for production? What are effective 
adaptation options? How will trade patterns underpinning food security 
be affected? Will international efforts to reduce climate change be effective?






Degree of climate risks.
Coherence and quality of policy implementation for 
food systems outcomes. Specifically, the adoption of holistic 
and forward-looking food systems policy making approach or 
continuing with a disjointed sectoral policy making.
Degree to which governance supports and enhances 
poverty reduction.
Will policy making continue to be captured by the 
political elite? Will political support for development be 
selfish, or nation-state oriented (inclusive and pragmatic)? Will 
there continue to be endemic institutionalized corruption in 
Malawian society?
The nature and structure of economy - will it be 
focused more on agricultural or technological? Will it be 
diversified? What other sectors might drive the economy?  
Regionalism: Will impetus/control of regional development be 
through SADC, COMESA or EAC? 
Will regional development be effective?
Effective climate action globally.
Stable global food prices. 
Significant investment in climate-smart agricultural 
adaptations and technologies. 
The increasing use of technology in food systems 
more generally has resulted in younger generations continuing 
to work in agriculture and associated activities. 
Water-use efficiency has improved, resulting in the 
expansion of irrigation and less reliance on rain-fed agriculture. 
This, in part, is also facilitated by increasing power generation 
from solar and wind and reduced reliance on hydropower. 
Malawi imports what is better grown elsewhere and 
grows what is most efficient to do so domestically–
the trade balance ensures that diets are healthy with adequate 
supply of both macro and micro-nutrients.
Small-scale farmers, alongside large-scale commercial cash-
crop farmers, have benefited from the broad-based nature of the 
policy priorities and have become increasingly food secure, 
both from their own production, but also from the improved 
income-generating potential of their marketable surpluses.
Smallholders in general are recipients of more appropriate 
and better financed training, including on the appropriate 
use of novel technologies. 
Emergence of a new middle class of commercially 
successful, previously small-scale, farmers. 
Improved access to and availability of more 
diversified agricultural production is resulting in 
Malawians in general eating a more nutritious and sustainable 
diet than they have been accustomed to.
MALAWI
Scenarios considered:
GRCF-AFRICAP scenarios for Malawi; and
FAO/EPIC Climate Smart Agriculture 
Scenario.
Key drivers and uncertainties
Features of desired future





Climate change: what will the impacts be? How effective will adaptation 
be? Will international factors to reduce climate change be effective?
Market connectivity and function: Will Zambia’s import and exports 
of food be part of a regional and international trading system? Will domestic 
markets function effectively so that demand and supply are responsive? How 
will demand and supply affect food price and stability?
How will commodity prices move? Will the economy grow, diversify 
and be sustainable vs. focused only on rapid economic growth?
Whether the state (this was changed to include all institutions) 
could be efficient and implement adaptive policies, i.e. be adaptive.
Technological impact relating to the extent to which technological 
change will shape the Tanzanian food system, through the 
development and adoption of new technologies and the impacts they 
will have on agriculture, food, processing, employment, markets.
Climate risk relating not only to the severity and frequency of 
climate change impacts, but also the exposure and vulnerability 
of agriculture and other food system components, actors, and 
infrastructure.
Market development was a close third in terms of uncertainties 
identified.
High and steady economic growth.
Institutions that are efficient and highly adaptable. 
Low climate risk–global action to manage climate change was effective.
High market connectivity–national food system connected to regional 
and international markets.
Extensive use of conservation agriculture.
Participatory management of forests.
Improved irrigation infrastructure.
Technofix Scenario (technological transformation and low 
climate risk).
This scenario sees Tanzanian agriculture transformed by the 
development and adoption of pro-poor technologies, 
underpinned by substantial public research and 
development (R&D) and investment. Farmers have adopted 
new crop varieties with traits that increase resilience to climate change, 
whilst R&D for traditional and orphan crop varieties has helped 
increase crop diversity and dietary diversity. Supported by international 
climate finance, other technologies such as irrigation, early-warning 
systems and improved weather forecasting have been widely adopted. 
Increased yields have reduced tensions over land, helped stop 
deforestation and have supported reforestation in targeted areas whilst 
facilitating agricultural exports. Climate impacts have not been 
as pronounced as originally feared.
ZAMBIA
Scenarios considered:
GRCF-AFRICAP scenarios for Zambia; and
FAO/EPIC Climate Smart Agriculture Scenario Zambia.
TANZANIA
Scenarios considered:
GRCF-AFRICAP scenarios for Tanzania.
Key drivers and uncertainties
Key drivers and uncertainties
Features of desired future
Features of desired future
1.
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The country’s resilience to climate change and other 
external factors.
Socioeconomic transformation.
Human resources: migration policy carefully moderates 
ex-patriot labour flows with good relations between 
migrants and native population. Seychelles becomes a 
center for knowledge on the blue economy.
National identity: peaceful and harmonious, women’s 
empowerment, strong national identity. Seychellois are in 
tune with the nation’s diverse makeup, with a keen focus 
on acceptance and embracing the multitude of ancestral 
backgrounds that has made the country what it is today.
Education and technology: Seychelles has become 
a tech-savvy nation which exploits the benefits of simple 
but fit-for-purpose technology solutions. There exists a 
framework conducive to the development of home-grown 
technological inventions, and strong investment in creating 
the necessary technological infrastructure. 
Strong private sector: economic transformation has 
been achieved with considerable success, with greater 
value-addition in all sectors. The private sector operates 
unhindered, as government has taken decisive steps to 
minimize bureaucracy.
Financial sector: the financial sector is sound, allowing 
for ease of business and it is responsive to the emerging 
market opportunities with a focus on sustainable, smart 
savings and investment products for the Seychelles 
market. Seychelles has also established a niche market in 
specialized offshore financial services.
SEYCHELLES
Scenarios considered:
Seychelles Department of Economic 
Planning, 2019.
Key drivers and uncertainties
Features of desired future
The Garden of Eden is the best-case scenario. Here, the economy has 
been transformed through diversification and is enjoying a stable growth trajectory. 
Growth is inclusive and sustainable, with the Seychellois people placed at the center 
of all development efforts. Seychelles is a unified nation in which citizens 
have been able to overcome political, religious, and social divides. 
Moreover, the country has become resilient to the adverse effects of climate change 
by taking all necessary measures to minimize damage to property and to safeguard 
lives. 
The government is democratic, transparent, accountable and practices 
sound governance, with the interests and wellbeing of every citizen at the core of 
government policy. The three branches of government (executive, legislative and 
parliamentary) work efficiently to ensure the smooth running of the country. 
The Seychellois people have high levels of trust in government 
institutions to deliver on their respective mandates and to ensure the highest 
possible levels of public service delivery. Because citizens have been placed at the 
center of development, they are active participants in the development 
process. Seychellois are engaged in the productive sectors of the economy, with a 
large year on year increase in the number of locals employed directly and indirectly in 
tourism, fisheries, the financial sector as well as other supporting industries.
Resilience to climate change: 
Seychelles has experienced challenges leading 
up to attaining the goals envisioned in this 
scenario (e.g., rising sea levels, drought, storm surges, 
abnormally high temperatures and regional conflicts). 
However, the country was able to adapt due to the 
numerous measures taken to ensure resilience 
in the face of such climatic and external phenomena and 
through socioeconomic transformation. 
Governance is on par with international norms 
and best democratic practices. People are indeed at the 
center of development, allowing them to become the 
drivers of development. Society is peaceful and a sense 
of national pride, unity and solidarity prevails. Science, 
technology, and innovative ways of solving 
challenges have been mainstreamed into daily 
life, acting as a catalyst for development. 
Jobs, income, and investment opportunities 
are all indicating economic growth and 
improved performance. The nation remains a 
champion of climate-smart development, a pioneer in 
environmental conservation, and a center of expertise 
on the blue economy. Resilience has proven to 
be the essential ingredient for ensuring that 





Level of crime/security in the territory.
Investment into agricultural market 
development.
Efficacy of local institutions.
Growth/decline in inequality.
The extent to which policy enforcement affects water 
availability. 
The impact of climate change on water resources, 
in terms of the amount of rainfall.  
Quality of governance.
Level of investment into the economy.
Territorial level governance 
strengthened, and investment increased.
Security issues–personal safety from 
crime is enhanced.
Inequality is reduced.
Agro-ecology and family-based 
farming dominate agricultural systems.
In this scenario, there is effective policy 
implementation and more rainfall, meaning 
sufficient water availability. Water reforms driven by 
occurrence of severe drought in Botswana leads to 
implementation of a water management reform.  
Construction of a large dam and a hydropower 
station in Botswana improves water and energy 
availability.  In addition, alternative farming practices 
are implemented, and water scarcity compels bilateral 
cooperation between Kenya and Botswana.  
By the year 2025, large dams are being constructed 
to control flood water and also contribute to economic 
diversification and growth of employment. 
By the year 2035, Botswana becomes the food basket 
supplying agricultural produce to other SADC 
countries.
Gender and youth employment supported in government programs.
Homes use gas for cooking and solar power for energy.
Restoration of degraded ecosystems.
Investment in green-gray coastal defenses reduces cost of climate 
impacts and loss of human life.
Affordable high-quality health care available to all.
Natural gas used for electricity generation and zero carbon emission 
power plants.
Country joins BRICS as emerging shining light in development pathways.












It includes countries in East and Southern Africa 
(ESA) comprises ten coastal countries bordering the 
Western Indian Ocean (WIO)–Comoros, France, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, 
Somalia, South Africa, and Tanzania.
Scenarios considered:
Obura et al., 2018.Key drivers and 
uncertainties
Key drivers and uncertainties
Key drivers and uncertainties
Features of desired future
Features of desired future
Features of desired future     
(where governance is high quality and investment high)
Analysis
What have we learned from 
this synthesis of scenarios? 
First, we can see that from global to 
national level many of the drivers are the 
same (e.g., population growth, economic 
development, climate change) but they 
become increasingly specific to the 
context being considered. In addition, we 
see some new and different drivers arise 
at local scales–such as the outcomes of 
land reform or climate change impacts on 
rainfall patterns. In some cases, the drivers 
are relatively short lived–e.g., youth bulge 
in population at SSA level is important up 
to 2050 but then less so.  
A second issue we can see emerging is 
that as one moves from global to local 
levels there is an increasing number of 
drivers that are determined outside the 
scope and influence of the decision-making 
level represented. That is, more drivers are 
exogenous and need to be considered but 
unlikely to be influenced. That difference is 
important in using scenarios to help guide 
strategic planning, as it highlights where 
planners and decision-makers can have 
impact. So, in the case of regional planning 
for SADC climate resilient pathways of 
development it is key to understand what 
levers of power and decision-making 
actually reside at this level.
CONSENSUS AND DIFFERENCES IN 
VISIONING AN IDEAL FUTURE FOR SADC
As for the ideal future, analyzing the results of scenarios from SADC 
to country level in the region we can see there is considerable 
consensus but also some areas of diverse opinions. The main areas of 
consensus are the following:
Much higher levels of equality in income distribution than currently 
found.
Improved governance–away from corruption and elite capture of benefits.
Greater awareness and value given to conserving and improving 
natural resource management and environment.
Greater connectivity between people at the regional level facilitated 
by technology.
Improved productivity and market participation for small-scale 
agricultural producers (and thus higher incomes and better livelihoods).
Reduction in food imports–more reliance on domestic production.
Greatly expanded regional level of investment and management 
of transport, energy, water use and communications.
Increased investment in education and health of entire population 
(e.g., better investment across population in human capital development).
Some areas where there are divergent ideas on how an ideal 
future would look for the SADC region include:
Role of regional 
government:   
To facilitate coordinating 
activities but with 
decision-making mostly 
decentralized to local 
level, or a much stronger 
centralization of decision-
making power at national 
and regional levels.
The nature of the 
transition to get to the 
ideal future. In some 
cases, this was envisioned 
as highly disruptive and 
traumatic (e.g., revolution), 
in other cases a slower, 
planned and less disruptive 
transition.
Relative importance of 
small-scale farming 
sector to economic 
growth and food 
supply–in one future 
most food supply and a 
big source of economic 
growth is small-scale 
farmers, in other they 
are important for their 
own food supply but 
larger scale commercial 
enterprises are more 
important for supplying 
urban population and 
contributing to national 
economic growth.
The degree to which the 
region is inward or outward 
looking. In one future 
SADC is a highly 
effective regional 
institution whose 
economic, social, and 
political connections 
remain mostly 
within the region. In 
an alternative version, 
SADC is an effective 
instrument for 
connecting the region 
to broader networks 
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DRIVERS AND KEY UNCERTAINTIES AT THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
In this final section a summary of how some key drivers and their associated uncertainties are treated in the global, SSA and SADC level of analysis are summarized below.  This analysis indicates the 
degree to which the uncertainties associated with each driver shift depending on the level of analysis, and also the degree of leverage that decision-makers may have therein.








FOOD SOURCE/PRICE GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENTAL
ENERGY SOURCE/PRICE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY ECONOMIC GROWTH
Level and distribution of 
growth
Food prices in global markets rising 
or falling
Global food trade increased or 
decreased
Strong governance of global public goods
Level of GHG emissions
Climate change impacts – 
rate and distribution
Water availability
Oil price on global markets
Rate of shift from fossil fuels to 
alternative energy sources
Global level and source of investment into 
agricultural R&D
Level of technologically driven 
productivity increases
Rate and distribution 
of growth globally
Rate of population growth 
Fertility rate in SADC
Percentage of population 
under age 24 (youth bulge)
Food prices in global markets rising or 
falling
Increase in regional production of food
Increase in regional food trade versus 
individual country
Strong governance of global public goods
Stability and quality of national governance 
systems in SADC
Level and effectiveness of regional governance
Development of regionally coordinated 
infrastructure for water, energy, transport, and 
food sectors
Level of GHG emissions
Climate change driven 
change in rainfall/
temperature patterns
Regional management of 
water resources
Improvements in soil/
land resources to reduce 
degradation
Management of natural 
resources in agricultural 
production systems
Changes in land tenure 
systems and their impacts 
on farmers incentives
Oil price on global markets
Investment levels in renewable energy 
sources
Regional coordination of energy 
supplies and transmissions
SADC level and source of investment into 
agricultural R&D
Rate of productivity growth in small-scale and 
commercial agricultural sectors
Sources of productivity growth
Rate of growth of 
industrial sector 
Contribution of 
agricultural sector to GDP
Rate of population growth 
Fertility rate in SSA
Percentage of population 
under age 24 (youth bulge)
Food prices in global markets rising or 
falling
Increase in domestic production of food 
Increase/decrease in food imports
Strong governance of global public goods
Stability and quality of national governance 
systems in SSA
Level of GHG emissions
Climate change impacts – 
rate and distribution in SSA
Improvements in soil/land 
resources management
Management of natural 
resources in agricultural 
production systems
Effectiveness of adaptation 
actions
Oil price on global markets
Investment levels in renewable energy 
sources
Development of decentralized or 
centralized energy transmission systems
SSA level and source of investment into agricultural R&D
Rate of productivity growth in small-scale and 
commercial agricultural sectors
Source of productivity growth: technology/efficiency 
driven or expansion of agricultural land area
Rate and source of 






PATHWAYS IN THE 
SADC REGION
Identifying key 
uncertainties outside the 
scope of influence of the 
SADC region, but which 
could have major impacts on 
the effectiveness of climate 
resilient pathways in the region.
Identifying key 
investments and actions 
that should be included in plans.
Identifying some critical 
differences amongst 
SADC member countries 
that should be considered in 
developing a regional level plan. 
These three potential uses 
correspond to the different 
levels of analysis of the 
scenarios, with global and 
SSA level falling into the first 
category, SADC regional level 
and some country studies 
in the second and the third 
coming from the individual 
country level summaries.
The global and SSA level 
analyses indicate that direct 
factors of global food and 
energy prices and global 
trading patterns for these are 
uncertain, and their eventual 
evolution would certainly 
have major impacts on 
the successful design and 
implementation climate resilient 
pathways in the SADC region.
Insights on what types of actions and investments are 
needed comes primarily from the SADC level analysis, as 
well as some of the country level studies.  Investments in 
regional level infrastructure to facilitate trade in food, energy, 
transport and water emerges as an essential requirement 
for effective regional cooperation as well as reduction in 
risks associated with climate change (e.g. water and energy 
scarcity), food shortages (e.g. trading agreements and 
transportation).
The level and targeting of investments into the 
agricultural sector are another key leverage point 
in the region, as it will influence not only the 
availability and price of food and thus the level 
and costs associated with food imports, but 
also potentially the quality of rural livelihoods for 
smallholder producers and associated reductions 
in poverty and food insecurity.
Investments in increasing efficiency of agricultural 
production can generate economic, social, and 
environmental benefits by increasing the returns 
to farming and improving livelihoods and reducing 
pressures for agricultural land expansion and 
improper use of agricultural inputs. 
The country level analyses indicate that increasing 
inclusiveness and reducing inequality are 
important factors across all countries, indicating 
the importance of including measures and 
investments directly targeting these objectives in 
climate resilient development plans for the region.
Likewise, improvements in governance towards 
more transparent, coordinated, and effective 
policies and institutions is clearly a priority across 
all the country summaries.
However, some major differences in 
priority issues also emerge from the 
country level analyses.
Technology is given high priority in 
Tanzania.
Land tenure is considered a burning 
issue in South Africa. 
High incidence of crime is a major 
problem in Madagascar.
Investing in coastal impact defenses 
to reduce climate change impact is a 
priority in the Seychelles. 
While a regional level plan and 
investments for climate resilient 
development cannot address every 
issue facing each of the member 
countries, the potential impacts of these 
varying constraints and challenges are 
important to include in the planning 
process.
While these summaries are only a 
selection of those that have been 
done, focusing only on certain 
aspects of agricultural food systems 
and livelihoods, they do provide 
considerable insights into key building 
blocks of climate resilient pathways 
of development for the SADC region.  
They not only indicate key constraints 
and uncertainties that plans must 
address, but also key strengths and 
opportunities for successfully achieving 
climate resilient livelihoods in the region.
Likewise, the strength of global 
governance, in particular the 
ability to achieve levels of 
climate change mitigation to 
lower levels are uncertain, mostly 
outside the scope of SADC 
to influence, and critical to 
determining the effectiveness of 
climate resilient development.    
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How can these insights from recent 
scenario studies be used in the 
development of climate resilient 
pathways in the SADC region?  
Essentially there are three ways these 
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